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Electronic Trespass in Canada: The Protection of Private
Property on the Internet 
James Macdonald†
Internet. Of course, this conclusion presupposes thatI. Introduction 
property rights in fact exist on the Internet. While Amer-
ican courts have accepted the existence of property rightst is perhaps trite to observe that the rapid growth of
on the Internet without any real controversy, a signifi-I the Internet has led to the development of a dynamic
cant body of criticism has developed around Americanbody of law loosely referred to as Internet law or
jurisprudence. Part III examines the critiques levelledcyberlaw. Issues that a decade ago would have baffled
against the assumption of property rights inherent inthe majority of lawyers and academics — ‘‘e-commerce
electronic trespass, and argues that there are propertypatents, e-commerce law, trademark and domain name
rights that need to be protected on the Internet. Part IVconflicts, online copyright infringement, jurisdiction in
addresses the practical issue of whether electronic tres-cyberspace, and web site liability for defamation’’ 1 — are
pass is available at common law in Canada. Focusing onnow firmly established areas of the law, ripe for litigation
the tangible quality of electronic communications andand academic discourse. The development of Internet
the lack of requirement to show actual damages, thislaw has not been even across all disciplines, however;
paper concludes that electronic trespass is a viable causewhile intellectual property is seen as synonymous with
of action in Canada. Despite being a viable cause ofInternet law, tort law has for the most part been left
action, Part V examines the concerns of the anticom-behind. 2 The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled on the
mons movement, and considers whether Canadianrelationship of intellectual property to the Internet, 3 but
courts should forgo electronic trespass and adopt anno court in Canada has considered the availability of
alternative doctrine resembling nuisance. In rejectingprivate property rights such as trespass to chattels. 4 As a
such an approach, this paper concludes with a discussionresult, important questions over the application of prop-
of the importance of consent as a means of imposingerty rights to the Internet have remained unanswered.
rationality on the operation of electronic trespass, andCanadian courts need not start from scratch when
questions the usefulness of legislative reform.formulating a Canadian approach to Internet property
issues. Just as tort law lags behind intellectual property
law, Canada lags behind the United States in Internet
II. Electronic Trespass in the Unitedjurisprudence. While this may be a source of frustration
for Canadian lawyers, the result is that Canadian courts States 
have the benefit of almost a decade of litigation in the
United States concerning the protection of property Creation of Electronic Trespass: Thrifty-
rights on the Internet. The source of this American juris- Tel
prudence is the resurrection of the ‘‘late, largely unla-
he starting point for the development of electronicmented tort of trespass to chattels’’ as the tort of elec- T trespass in the United States was the Californiatronic trespass. 5 Part II of this paper traces the
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v.development of electronic trespass in the United States,
Bezenek. 6 While the case did not deal with the issue offrom the initial application of trespass to chattels to tele-
trespass over the Internet, it is important because thephone communications to the creation of the doctrine
court held for the first time that electronic signals wereof electronic trespass to deal with spam, web robots, and
‘‘sufficiently tangible to support a trespass cause ofspyware.
action’’. 7This paper argues that Canadian courts can, and
should, adopt electronic trespass as a viable cause of The defendants in Thrifty-Tel were involved in
action for the protection of property rights on the what was popularly known as ‘‘phreaking’’: exploiting
†LL.B. (Ottawa), Articling Student at Ogilvy Renault LLP. This paper is the winning entry of the 2006 IT.Can Student Writing Competition.
The author would like to thank Professor Michael Geist at the University of Ottawa and the IT.Can Student Writing Competition Committee for their helpful




































































164 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
telephone networks by technological means to obtain spectre of spam (and perhaps the lack of effective legisla-
free services. Using a confidential access code, the tive approaches), 18 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the
defendants used a modem to connect to the plaintiff United States successfully used Thrifty-Tel to find lia-
telephone carrier’s telephone network. Once they gained bility for spammers based on the tort of electronic tres-
access to the network, the defendants ran manual and pass. 19
automated searches for the authorization codes required In CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. 20 the
to access the plaintiff’s automated switching network, plaintiff ISP sought a preliminary injunction based on
which in turn allowed the defendants to make free long trespass to chattels to stop the defendants from sending
distance calls. While the manual searches had an appar- spam to its customers over its network. The court relied
ently negligible impact on the plaintiff’s system, the auto- on the Restatement (Second) of Torts for its formulation
matic searches ‘‘overburdened the system’’, preventing of the proper test: ‘‘a trespass to chattel may be com-
other users from accessing the system.8 mitted by intentionally using or intermeddling with the
The plaintiff succeeded at trial on the basis of con- chattel in possession of another’’. 21 Following Thrifty-Tel,
version in the unauthorized use of the confidential the court held that electronic signals were sufficiently
codes. On appeal, however, the court noted that conver- tangible to support a trespass action. 22
sion actions were not traditionally allowed if they only The court concluded that the defendants’ actionsrelated to ‘‘intangible interests that are not merged with, diminished the value of the plaintiff’s network, evenor reflected in, something tangible’’. 9 The court did not though the defendants did not physically damage thefully consider this issue, since it held that the evidence network. 23 The plaintiff only had to show a ‘‘diminutionwas sufficient to support an action based on the ‘‘seldom of [the server’s] quality, condition or value’’; to hold oth-employed’’ tort of trespass to chattel. 10 An action could erwise would blur the distinction between conversionbe made in trespass to chattel ‘‘where an intentional and trespass to chattels. 24 The affidavit evidence of Com-interference with the possession of personal property has puServe technicians stated that storing and processingproximately caused injury’’. 11 Quoting Prosser’s charac- spam placed a ‘‘tremendous burden on [CompuServe’s]terization of trespass to chattels as the ‘‘little brother of equipment’’. 25 While the court did not discuss howconversion’’, the court emphasized the tort’s applicability much of this burden was specifically the result of theto situations where personal property was merely used defendant, it was satisfied that ‘‘to the extent that defend-without authorization. 12 ants’ multitudinous electronic mailings demand the disk
In Thrifty-Tel, the court had little difficulty con- space and drain the processing power of plaintiff’s com-
cluding on the evidence that the defendants’ actions puter equipment’’, the defendant’s actions reduced the
were intentional, that the plaintiff had a possessory resources that CompuServe could supply its subscribers,
interest in the telephone network, and that the defend- which in turn diminished the value the plaintiff could
ants’ actions likely damaged the telephone network. 13 As derive from its computer equipment. 26 The court further
stated above, the court also found that an action in tres- noted that the defendants’ actions resulted in customer
pass to chattels could be based on the electronic signals complaints and cancellations, which harmed Com-
sent from the defendants’ modem over the plaintiff’s puServe’s ‘‘business reputation and goodwill with its cus-
telephone network. The court held that the original tomers’’. 27
requirement in trespass of direct physical contact had
been expanded to allow for indirect contact. Further, the
court held that the ‘‘requirement of a tangible has been
Electronic Trespass and Robots: eBay andrelaxed almost to the point of being discarded’’, 14 noting
Ticketmasterthat other courts had already based actions in trespass on
microscopic particles, smoke, and sound waves. 15 With In the wake of the successful application of electronic
this relatively brief legal analysis — entirely contained trespass to spam, established Internet corporations suc-
within a single footnote — the court established the legal cessfully widened the application of electronic trespass to
basis for parties to enforce their property rights on the include communications between commercial parties
Internet. over the Internet in a series of cases concerned with the
use of robots. Robots, also known as spiders, Web bots,
or Web crawlers, are software agents: code designed to
Electronic Trespass and Spam: automate the actions of human users. The most signifi-
CompuServe cant use of robots, though by no means the sole use, is to
As even the most casual user of e-mail is well aware, ‘‘crawl’’ the Internet to populate search engine databases.
spam is ‘‘unsolicited commercial e-mail’’ that clogs the In this capacity, robots are essential to the practical oper-
inboxes of Internet users. 16 In 2004, spam accounted for ation of the Internet. Google’s database, for instance, con-
as much as 80% of global e-mail traffic, lowering effi- tains information on literally billions of Web pages; a
ciency and trust in the Internet, and acting as a ‘‘direct database this size simply could not be created, let alone
threat to the viability of the Internet as an effective maintained, in any efficient manner by human agents.
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of a robot/spider and the technological process involved proxy servers to circumvent eBay’s attempts to block
in crawling: known IP addresses used by the robot. 37
[A] spider is a program that automatically traverses the Adopting the Supreme Court of California’s reasons
Web’s hypertext structure by retrieving a document, and in Thrifty-Tel, the court outlined the test for trespass to
recursively retrieving all documents that are referenced. A chattels over the Internet as follows:spider visits a Web page, reads it, and then follows links to
other pages within the site. This is what it means when In order to prevail on a claim for trespass based on
someone refers to a site being ‘‘spidered’’ or ‘‘crawled’’. 28 accessing a computer system, the plaintiff must establish:
(1) defendant intentionally and without authorizationThe language in the above definition needs some
interfered with plaintiff’s possessory interest in theclarification: the use of terms such as ‘‘traverse’’and
computer system; and‘‘crawl’’ gives the impression that the robot somehow
(2) defendant’s unauthorized use proximately resultedinhabits the target server. In reality, the robot only oper-
in damage to plaintiff. 38ates as software on the originating server, sending out
multiple requests to the target server. 29 In applying this test to the present facts, the court largely
followed the rationale used by the courts in Com-In admittedly broad terms, robots are used to access
puServe and subsequent spam cases.the contents of Web sites for one of two reasons: (1) to
create a value-added product that does not directly com- The defendant argued that it did not access the
pete with the target Web site; or (2) to directly compete plaintiff’s Web site without authorization because the
with the target Web site. 30 Examples of the former Web site was freely accessible to the public. While the
include the Googlebot or MSNBot; both robots attempt court elsewhere questioned the appropriateness of com-
to compile a comprehensive listing of publicly accessible paring the passage of the defendant’s robot through the
content on the Internet. The generally positive impact of plaintiff’s network to a physical intrusion into a ‘‘brick
these robots on the Internet is rightly lauded. 31 While and mortar’’ store, 39 the court stated that the plaintiff’s
these robots are for the most part created with a com- network was private property, to which the public is
mercial purpose, they do not compete directly with the only given ‘‘conditional access’’. 40 When the defendant
Web sites they crawl. Indeed, in the majority of cases it crawled the Web site despite repeated requests from the
will benefit the owner to have his or her Web site plaintiff to desist, the defendant exceeded the scope of
crawled by these robots so the content can be found by the plaintiff’s consent. The defendant was likewise
potential users. 32These beneficial robots (to date) have unsuccessful in its argument that it did not interfere
not provoked electronic trespass litigation. 33 The second with the plaintiff’s possessory interest in the network.
type of robot, however, is not particularly beneficial to The defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to
the party whose server is being crawled. 34 These robots prove a substantial interference with its possessory
are programmed to access a specific server, usually in an interest, which was not evident on the facts. While the
attempt to copy the contents of a competitor’s Web site. court agreed that the plaintiff would likely be unable to
prove that there was a substantial interference, the courtA robot’s activities were first held actionable in elec-
went on to hold that while there was ‘‘some uncertaintytronic trespass by a California district court in eBay, Inc.
as to the precise level of possessory interference requiredv. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. 35 The defendant, Bidder’s Edge, ran
to constitute an intermeddling’’, the plaintiff was onlyan auction aggregation Web site: instead of hosting auc-
required to show that the defendant had ‘‘use oftions, the defendant’s Web site provided users with list-
another’s personal property’’. 41ings from multiple third-party auction sites. The defen-
dant used a robot to crawl third-party auction sites, In assessing whether the plaintiff would be able to
including eBay.com, to populate its database. The defen- prove actual damages, the court adopted the formulation
dant was initially given verbal approval to crawl the of damages used in CompuServe: ‘‘A trespasser is liable
plaintiff’s Web site while the two parties negotiated a when the trespass diminishes the condition, quality or
licensing agreement. When the negotiations ended value of personal property’’. 42 The defendant testified
without success, the plaintiff requested that the defen- that it sent 80,000 to 100,000 requests per day over the
dant stop including information about eBay auctions on plaintiff’s network. While this number may at first seem
its Web site. While the defendant initially complied with impressive, the defendant’s actions accounted for at most
the plaintiff’s request, it continued to use a robot to crawl 1.1% of the data transferred over the plaintiff’s network. 43
eBay’s servers, despite additional unsuccessful negotia- The plaintiff did not, however, claim any specific
tions, and despite further notices from the plaintiff that damage above the use of its network. 44 Nonetheless, the
its activities were unauthorized. In response to the con- court held that this level of activity was likely sufficient
tinued crawling of its Web site by the defendant, the to find real damage:
plaintiff attempted to block the Bidder’s Edge robot
Even if, as [Bidder’s Edge] argues, its searches use only athrough technological means. The technological small amount of eBay’s computer system capacity, [Bidder’s
response proved largely ineffective, however; the robot Edge] has nonetheless deprived eBay of the ability to use
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The law recognizes no such right to use another’s personal In Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 51 the plaintiff
property. 45 domain name registrar brought a preliminary motion to
prevent the defendant from crawling its WHOISFurther, the court held that if it did not find that the
database52 to collect information on registrants for mar-defendant’s use constituted an injury to the plaintiff, ‘‘it
keting purposes. In granting the plaintiff’s motion, thewould likely encourage other auction aggregators to
court adopted the lower standard established in eBay. 53crawl the eBay site, potentially to the point of denying
While the plaintiff was unable to provide any directeffective access to eBay’s customers’’. 46
measurement of the system resources tied up by the
American commentators have criticized the deci- defendant’s robot54 (and the court did not cite any evi-
sion in eBay for being too expansive in its application of dence that the plaintiff’s network actually had suffered
electronic trespass. Maureen O’Rourke expressed the from the defendant’s actions), the court reaffirmed that
general consensus among critics when she argued that mere use, even if negligible, was sufficient to constitute
eBay created ‘‘a broad rule that would allow a site to an interference with a possessory interest. The court also
obtain an injunction against all unwanted visitors’’, a accepted the plaintiff’s ‘‘floodgate’’ argument — that
property right that is broader than exists in real property allowing the defendant to continue to crawl its network
law (where intangible interferences are dealt with would encourage other parties to do the same —  but it
through a balanced approach in nuisance), and trespass considered this in connection with the irreparable harm
to chattels (where the duration and size of the interfer- factor of the test for receiving an injunction, not for
ence can limit liability). 47 In the face of this concern over whether the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits
the unchecked growth of electronic trespass, however, of its claim.
the availability of the tort was restricted in the first
The minimum level of interference required inreported decision to consider eBay.
Ticketmaster was explicitly rejected in Oyster Software,
In Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., 48 the Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc. 55 In this case, the defendant
defendant ran a Web site that included information on used a robot to copy metatags from the plaintiff’s Web
tickets offered for sale on the plaintiff’s Web site, as well site to improve its search engine rankings. 56 The plaintiff
as links to the specific pages on the plaintiff’s Web site brought an action against the defendant for, among
where users could purchase tickets. As in eBay, the infor- other things, trespass to chattels. The defendant brought
mation from the plaintiff’s Web site was collected with a a motion for summary judgment on the trespass claim,
robot. The defendant did not receive any money from arguing that its robot did not compromise ‘‘the basic
users who purchased tickets from the plaintiff, but pre- function’’ of the plaintiff’s network. Indeed, on the plain-
sumably benefited from increased traffic due to more tiff’s own evidence the defendant’s actions had a negli-
comprehensive listings. There was no contractual rela- gible effect on its network. In considering what level of
tionship between the parties, and the plaintiff took tech- interference was required, the court concluded that Tick-
nological measures to prevent the links from the defen- etmaster had incorrectly interpreted eBay; the plaintiff
dant’s Web site from working properly. 49 The plaintiff had a valid claim in trespass ‘‘not because the interfer-
brought a motion seeking a preliminary injunction to ence was ‘substantial’ but simply because the defendant’s
prevent the defendant from crawling the plaintiff’s net- conduct amounted to ‘use’ of’’ the plaintiff’s network. 57
work. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for a pre- This requirement that the plaintiff merely show ‘‘use’’
liminary injunction. However, despite professing to was even less onerous than in eBay, where the plaintiff
follow eBay, the court’s reasoning in Ticketmaster was at had to show some damage flowing form the interfer-
odds with the prior decision. ence.
The court noted that the burden the defendant’s
robot placed on the plaintiff’s network ‘‘appears very Limiting Electronic Trespass: Intelsmall and there is no showing that the use interferes to
any extent with the regular business of [the plaintiff]. If it The California Supreme Court cast doubt on the correct-
did, an injunction might well issue. . .’’. 50 Further, the ness of the eBay approach in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 58 the
court did not believe that denying the injunction would current leading case on electronic trespass. Over the
likely result in other parties crawling the plaintiff’s Web course of 21 months, Hamidi, a disgruntled former
site to the point that its business would suffer. The court employee of the plaintiff, sent six ‘‘mass e-mails’’ to Intel
even reasoned that the defendant’s activities were likely employees via their Intel e-mail addresses. 59 The e-mails
beneficial to the plaintiff, as it possibly resulted in generally criticized Intel’s business and employment
increased ticket sales. The court failed to take into practices, and urged employees to join an advocacy
account eBay’s position that any loss of processing power group formed by Hamidi. Despite the absence of evi-
was sufficient for the establishment of damages; Tick- dence that Hamidi’s e-mails impaired the functioning of
etmaster, in effect, established a minimum level of inter- Intel’s computer network, 60 Intel received a permanent
ference that was absent from eBay. Post-Ticketmaster injunction enjoining Hamidi ‘‘from sending unsolicited
courts, however, largely abandoned the requirement that e-mail to addresses on Intel’s computer systems’’ on the
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Appeal upheld the lower court decision, stating that tres- CompuServe line of cases did not depend on the com-
pass to chattels without any proof of actual damage to mercial nature of the e-mails. CompuServe’s network
personal property was actionable because Hamidi ‘‘was was central to its business. The defendants’ actions lim-
disrupting [Intel’s] business by using its property’’. 62 In a ited CompuServe’s ability to use its network, leading to
thorough review of the relevant case law, the California customer dissatisfaction. It was not legally relevant
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the California whether the interference came in the form of spam or
Court of Appeal. some other activity such as a robot, as long as a portion
of the network was used without consent. However, IntelThe court held that in order to succeed on a tres-
does likely mean that mere use as advocated by Oysterpass action involving electronic contact, the defendant’s
Software is not enough. Given the court’s specific com-actions had to cause ‘‘some actual or threatened interfer-
parison to the level of harm experienced by ISPs in theence with the computers’ functioning’’. 63 In the opinion
spam cases to Hamidi’s actions, Intel has raised the harmof the court, eBay should not be read, as it was in Oyster
requirement in electronic trespass cases dealing with e-Software, as only requiring the ‘‘use’’ of the plaintiff’s
mail. In effect, Intel has limited the applicability of Com-network. 64 Instead, eBay and subsequent cases showed
puServe to spam, or at the very least to non-commercialthat the court would grant an interlocutory injunction
e-mails sent in volumes indicative of spam.when the interference was negligible only if denying the
claim would encourage others to use the plaintiff’s net- George Fibbe argues that the impact of Intel will be
work in a manner that would substantially interfere with minimal, stating that Intel ‘‘is a poor vehicle for assessing
the network’s function. 65 Thus, the court did not grant the interests of Web site owners against commercially
an injunction in Ticketmaster because the defendant’s harmful scrapers’’. 74 While Hamidi’s actions may have
actions were negligible and there was no threat of others annoyed Intel, they were unlikely to cause actual eco-
overburdening the plaintiff’s network in a similar nomic harm. Hamidi’s interference with the network
manner. 66 In the present case, the e-mails used only a did not ‘‘compromise any core aspect of [Intel’s] busi-
negligible portion of the plaintiff’s network. 67 Intel’s ness’’, 75 as opposed to robot cases where the interference
complaints were concerned solely with the content of directly affets the plaintiff’s ability to provide services to
the e-mail. In the opinion of the court, ‘‘those interests other users. As such, Intel was unable to show the irrepa-
are protected by other branches of tort law; in order to rable harm that was required for an injunction. Further,
address them, we need not create a fiction of injury to Intel failed to satisfy its self-help obligation by not
the communication system’’. 68 directing employees to request that their names be
removed from Hamidi’s mailing list; by contrast, inThose who hoped the court would maintain the
robot cases, the plaintiff rarely has the opportunity tolower standard set in eBay unsurprisingly took a negative
take effective self-help measures. 76view of the decision:
Despite Intel’s demands that he stop, and its efforts at
self-help, Hamidi persisted in intruding where he was not The Future of Electronic Trespass: Sotelowelcome. Intel posted a ‘‘Private Property, Keep Out’’ sign,
but Hamidi refused to comply, and the California Supreme Although there have not been any reported post-Intel e-Court refuses to honor it. 69
mail or robot cases, an Illinois district court recently
However, for critics of eBay, the decision in Intel was applied electronic trespass to spyware. In Sotelo v. Direc-
welcome because it ‘‘anchored’’ trespass to chattels ‘‘to its trevenue, LLC, et al., 77 the court allowed the plaintiff to
traditional foundation as a means for defending posses- proceed with a claim in trespass against the defendants
sion in personal chattels. . .’’. 70 While the decision in Intel for allegedly installing spyware surreptitiously on the
has received a mixed reaction, most commentators agree plaintiff’s computer. The defendants argued that since
that its practical effect was to limit the broad application the plaintiff could close every pop-up advertisement as it
of electronic trespass established in eBay. 71 appeared, there could not be any actual damage. The
Patricia Bellia argues that Intel not only limits the court held that this argument ignored ‘‘the reality of
application of eBay, but also undermines the very basis computer and Internet use. . .’’. 78 In its conception of the
for electronic trespass established in CompuServe. 72 The potential damages that could be claimed by the plaintiff,
core of Bellia’s reasoning is that the damage accepted in the court included ‘‘wasted time, computer security
CompuServe was the same type of damage rejected in breaches, lost productivity, and additional burdens on
Intel. In both cases, the networks could easily accommo- the computer’s memory and display capabilities’’. 79 This
date the increase in traffic; the e-mails caused damage list of injuries is consistent with eBay, as it either relates
because of their content (i.e., customers in CompuServe specifically to the capacity of the plaintiff’s computer, or
and employees in Intel having to deal with unwanted to time spent by the plaintiff servicing his computer in
messages). Thus, plaintiffs after Intel will have to show a relation to the defendant’s actions. 80 The recognition
significant interference with their networks to succeed. 73 that electronic trespass is equally applicable to an indi-
This argument is not entirely satisfying. While the con- vidual user’s personal computers as it is to a corporation’s
tent of the e-mails in CompuServe may have made for a server farm has the potential to encourage a diversity of
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viewing the legal rationale behind electronic trespass property law.88 Thus, Wendy Adams argues that in order
through varied factual situations will help settle ques- for actions in electronic trespass to be successful, courts
tions related to the required level of harm in the United rely on a legal fiction that transforms ‘‘processing activity
States. 82 into an object of property rights’’. 89
The difficulty with the above critique is that elec-
tronic trespass does not protect the property interest ofIII. Do Property Rights Exist on the intangible things such as bandwidth and processingInternet? power in and of themselves. Rather, electronic trespass
considers these things as intangible attributes of thehe question of whether or not electronic trespass
physical hardware. When the court in CompuServe heldT can succeed in Canada is, at its core, a debate over
that the interference diminished the server’s processingthe appropriate role, or even existence, of property on
power, it was not protecting the processing power, butthe Internet. Holding that a party can enforce private
rather, relying on the diminished processing power asproperty rights arising from electronic communications
proof of the interference to the server. Consider bynecessarily presupposes that there is a property right that
analogy the effect of an interference with a possessorycan be enforced. Unsurprisingly, this is not something all
interest in a car. The main attribute of the car, the reasoncommentators are ready to concede. Indeed, critics of
the car has value to its owner (in a utilitarian sense, atelectronic trespass are wary about the imposition of
least), is motion. If the owner is prevented from using theproperty norms on the Internet, warning that it
car due to an interference from another party — i.e., if he‘‘threatens the very foundations of the web’’. 83 This con-
or she is unable to use the car to move — the owner willcern is primarily advanced through the argument that
have an action in trespass to chattels against the otherelectronic trespass gives property rights reserved for chat-
party. The court would not give much credence to thetels to intangible objects.
other party’s argument that his or her actions only inter-
fered with the movement of the car, which as somethingDoes Electronic Trespass Give Property
intangible cannot be the subject of property rights. TheRights to an Intangible Object? 
right of the owner to use the car free from interference is
American courts have consistently concluded with little exactly what is protected from trespass. Similarly, the
difficulty, or even discussion, that computer networks are main functional attribute of a server is its processing
property for the purposes of trespass to chattels. Laura power. If someone interfered with the server in a way
Quilter criticizes this assumption as obscuring funda- that restricted the owner’s ability to use the server’s
mental questions about the nature of property on the processing power, the owner has a claim in trespass
Internet: ‘‘While computers are undoubtedly chattels, it based on interference to the server, not the processing
is questionable whether electronic networks and com- power. Adams states: ‘‘There is an object, the server, and
puter processing power also qualify as chattel.’’ 84 In a there is activity, the processing of requests, but the
similar manner, Daniel Hunter questions the willingness activity and the object are not one and the same.’’ 90
of courts to apply property rights to intangible things While critics of electronic trespass are wary of using
such as bandwidth and processing power: ‘‘With the place metaphors such as ‘‘cyberplace’’ when describing
exception of the computer itself, none of these ‘chattels’ the Internet, 91 they continue to rely on metaphor to the
are actually chattels at all. There is no private property in extent that they separate the activity of the Internet from
bandwidth or processing power or network.’’ 85 While it its physical reality. Under this conception, the activity of
is likely correct that an owner does not have a property the server is something more than a mere function of the
interest in something as ephemeral as processing power, physical hardware: it is a legal space that exists separately
the above critiques mischaracterize the property interests from the physical hardware that produces the activity. In
protected by electronic trespass. effect, focusing on the activity of the server as the legal
The hardware making up the network in an elec- object severs property rights from a chattel (the server)
tronic trespass case can be identified as a chattel without just because the chattel has a primarily intangible func-
any controversy: the hard drives, memory boards, com- tion.
puter racks, among other hardware items, are all tangible
A less theoretical criticism is that, while ostensiblyobjects that possess an identifiable value. 86 If an agent of
about the protection of chattels, electronic trespass isBidder’s Edge walked off with eBay’s physical servers,
really about the protection of information: the Web siteeBay would have a straightforward action in conversion.
may just be a function of the server, but it is the Web siteHowever, as the court noted in eBay, it is not clear if
that is actually being protected by electronic trespass. ToeBay could make a similar claim if Bidder’s Edge
quote a rather caustic passage from a decision in Tick-somehow stole its bandwidth. 87 Applying trespass to
etmaster:chattels to this example, it is logical to conclude that
eBay should not be able to sustain an action in trespass [Deleting the claim in trespass to chattels] should hurt
for interference with bandwidth; bandwidth, as an intan- no one’s policy feelings; after all, what is being attempted is
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new situation which should be disposed of by modern law court relied on previously recognized actions in trespass
designed to protect intellectual property interests. 92 to land based on microscopic particles, smoke, and
Indeed, electronic trespass cases tend to involve situa- sound waves. 98 The acceptance of an action over elec-
tions where the action in question threatened the protec- tronic signals was essential for the creation of electronic
tion of commercial data. 93 Electronic trespass allowed trespass. A Canadian court faced with the facts in Thrifty-
eBay to stop a competitor from crawling its database Tel would likewise find an absence of any prior
without having to resort to copyright law. However, criti- authority extending intangible incursions to trespass to
cizing electronic trespass because it may intersect with chattels. However, a Canadian court would not have any
intellectual property rights unduly limits the scope of significant prior authority allowing a trespass to land
Internet law to purely intellectual property matters. As based on an intangible excursion.
discussed above, electronic trespass can arise in situations
The volume of case law supporting the extension ofthat have nothing to do with the protection of copyright,
trespass to intangible incursions is minimal. The Courtsuch as spam or spyware. More importantly, the right to
of Appeal of Ontario in Bower v. Richardson Construc-exclude is a fundamental power given to the possessor of
tion Co. Ltd. 99 allowed damage to an adjoining propertya chattel in property law,94 and is not dependent on the
caused by vibrations emanating from a steam pile driverpossessor’s reasons. Once it is established that there is a
to be compensated in trespass. In McDonald et al. v.property right to protect, courts do not differentiate
Associated Fuels Ltd. et al., 100 the British Columbiabetween a reasonable attempt to exclude and an unrea-
Supreme Court suggested in obiter that damage causedsonable one. 95 Instead of rejecting electronic trespass on
by carbon monoxide blown into a residence from anpolicy grounds because it can be used to shield intellec-
exhaust pipe could be actionable in trespass to land.tual property from competitors, concerns over the pro-
These two rather antiquated cases have not been fol-tection of intellectual property through property law
lowed in subsequent decisions, and are at odds with theshould be dealt with through existing antitrust or intel-
general treatment of intangible incursions in trespasslectual property legislation.
law.101 Instead of opening trespass up to intangible incur-
sions, Canadian courts have persisted in holding that any
action concerned with an intangible interference to aIV. Is Electronic Trespass Actionable
property interest, such as the movement of smoke orin Canada? sound, is properly pleaded in nuisance. 102 This prefer-
ence is seen in Phillips v. California Standard Co.103 Thehile trespass to chattels has been revived in the
defendant’s ‘‘artificially generated seismic waves’’ 104 —W United States, it still languishes in relative obscu-
used to search for oil deposits — coursed through therity in Canada. Having discussed whether property rights
plaintiff’s property, causing damage. While the plaintiffeven exist on the Internet, it is useful now to examine
brought an action in trespass, the court held that thewhether these property rights can be protected at
plaintiff’s action was properly in nuisance: ‘‘trespasscommon law in Canada by the tort of electronic trespass.
involves a physical entry on the property of another andDespite the paucity of case law,96 the following defi-
in the case at bar that physical entry never tooknition represents the general consensus among Canadian
place’’. 105Despite the usual practice of dealing with intan-authorities: trespass to chattels is actionable ‘‘where the
gible incursions in nuisance, however, all is not lost fordefendant directly and intentionally (or negligently)
the potential plaintiff. The Canadian common law’s gen-interferes with a chattel in the possession of the plain-
eral recognition of the importance of the protection oftiff’’. 97 While the elements of the tort in Canada are
property rights and the need for legitimate compensa-similar to the requirements in the United States, there
tion suggest that a Canadian court would likely allow anare two possible differences in the tort’s potential appli-
action in electronic trespass to proceed.cation. The first difference concerns the tangible quality
of electronic signals — i.e., could Thrifty-Tel be followed Clifton Merrell has criticized the holding in Thrifty-
in Canada? While courts in the United States have found Tel, contending that ‘‘[e]lectrons seem entirely too ethe-
that electrons are sufficiently tangible for actions in tres- real and metaphysical to justify a cause of action at
pass, it is not clear that a Canadian court would come to law’’. 106 Further, allowing trespass by electronic signals
a similar conclusion. The second difference concerns the would lead to ‘‘absurd results’’, such as claims in trespass
likely absence of the need to show actual damage at to ‘‘fax machine[s] [and] household appliances attached
common law in Canada, removing a substantial stum- to an outlet’’. 107 Merrell’s litigious dystopia, however, may
bling block faced in the American actions. not be as ridiculous as first imagined. It is admittedly
difficult to think of situations where a person’s posses-
Can One Trespass with an Electron? sory interest in a toaster would be subject to a temporary
In Thrifty-Tel, the court considered for the first time interference by means of electrons. Nonetheless, if an
whether electronic signals were sufficiently tangible to intentional power surge over the electricity grid caused
sustain a claim in trespass to chattels in California. In the toaster to burst into flames, it would be counterintui-
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tort simply because the fire was caused by the move- however, as the question of whether damage was
ment of electrons, as opposed to a more tangible interfer- required was not at issue, and in any event the dissent
ence. The damage resulting from electronic trespass is was rejected on appeal. 115
not usually as obvious as a burning server farm; nonethe-
Lower courts have shown a willingness to allowless, the lack of physical indicia by no means equals an
actions in trespass to chattel without actual damage. Inabsence of damage or interference. 108 Denying a claim
Hudson’s Bay Co. v. White, 116 the defendant stole fivebecause the interference was not obviously physical
pairs of gloves from the plaintiff department store. Thewould conflict with the basic purpose of property torts at
defendant was apprehended by security, and the glovescommon law: the protection of an interest in a chattel. 109
were returned undamaged. The court held that trespass
While the different categories of tort are theoreti- to chattels was actionable without damage. In the
cally organized based on the nature of the interference absence of proof of actual damage, however, only nom-
— i.e., conversion for permanent interference, trespass to inal damages would be available. 117 In Burns v. Financial
chattels for transitory interference — the main focus is Bailiff Services Ltd., 118 the court held that the defendant
on the actual impact on the property. As even the scep- bailiffs trespassed on the plaintiffs’ van when they unlaw-
tical court in Ticketmaster noted: fully entered the van with the intent to seize it. Since the
plaintiffs ‘‘were never deprived of the use of the van . . .The computer is a piece of tangible personal property.
It is operated by mysterious electronic impulses which did they suffered no actual damages’’, 119 and were thus
not exist when the law of trespass to chattels was developed, unable to claim pecuniary damages. Despite the lack of
but the principles should not be too different. If the elec- actual damage, however, the claim in trespass to chattelstronic impulses can do damage to the computer or to its
was still used as an actionable wrong for the award offunction in a comparable way to taking a hammer to a piece
of machinery, then it is no stretch to recognize that damage punitive damages. While the case law is not conclusive, it
as trespass to chattels and provide a legal remedy for it. 110 suggests that trespass to chattels is actionable per se. 120
An action in electronic trespass, the issue of tangibilityThe hardware that makes up the Internet has the same
aside, should therefore be easier to establish in Canadaproperty interests as any other chattel. Courts should
than in the United States.therefore not have to unduly stretch the common law to
realize that a server could be severely damaged or cur-
tailed by electronic signals. 111 Disallowing claims in elec-
tronic trespass based on the questionable tangibility of
electronic signals would deny compensation for plaintiffs
V. Is Electronic Trespass the Bestwho have suffered real damage, an arbitrary result that
would showcase the inability of the law to account for Way to Protect Property Inter-
technological progress. Of course, property interests can ests? 
still be protected under nuisance. However, as discussed
below, nuisance is not the proper tort theory to protect ven if it is accepted that there are property interests
property rights on the Internet. 112 E on the Internet that need to be protected by prop-
erty torts, it is not immediately obvious that this has to
be done by trespass to chattels. A number of commenta-
tors have argued that the development of electronic tres-Is Actual Damage Required? pass will lead to the ‘‘tragedy of the anticommons’’. In an
A particular fixation in the American case law concerns attempt to protect the integrity of the Internet, these
the requirement to show actual damage in trespass to critics have called for the adoption of a cyber-nuisance
chattels. Although no Canadian court has specifically regime that balances the interests of owners and users. 121
addressed this issue, a plaintiff likely does not have to For supporters of electronic trespass, what the critics are
show actual damage to succeed on a claim in trespass to calling for ‘‘is the equivalent of declaring open season on
chattels in Canada. The Canadian Encyclopedic Digest cyber property, giving uncompensated rights to all-
summarizes the requirements for the tort as follows: ‘‘any comers for the use of a web site’s limited resources’’. 122
unauthorized touching or moving of a chattel is action- This position is unnecessarily alarmist, as the cyber-nui-
able at the suit of the possessor, even though no harm sance regime does not allow for unrestricted access.
ensues’’. 113 One of the few appellate-level discussions of Nonetheless, the creation of a cyber-nuisance regime
trespass to chattels advances the opposite proposition. In would leave an identifiable species of chattel open to
London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International physical interference in a manner inconsistent with
Ltd., Southin J.A. at the B.C. Court of Appeal adopted the Canadian common law. The policy issues raised by
following definition from Halsbury’s Laws of England in critics of electronic trespass need not be brushed aside,
her dissent: ‘‘Trespass to goods is an unlawful distur- however; the recognition of the importance of consent
bance of the possession of the goods by seizure or in the architecture of the Internet123 will allow for the
removal or by a direct act causing damage to the adoption of electronic trespass in a manner that ensures
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bridges the physical distance between a plaintiff andWill Electronic Trespass Lead to the
defendant. Despite this precedent, however, cyber-nui-Tragedy of the Anticommons? 
sance should not be adopted in favour of electronic tres-Whether or not property rights exist on the Internet,
pass.some commentators have argued (as mentioned above)
that electronic trespass should not be supported because Nuisance is properly focused on protecting an occu-
it will lead to the ‘‘tragedy of the anticommons’’: ‘‘no one pier’s proprietary interest in the use and enjoyment of his
will be allowed to access competitors’ cyberspace ‘assets’ or her real property; Linden thus describes nuisance as
without either licensing access or agreeing to some other an ‘‘environmental tort’’. 135 With the possible exception
transactionally expensive permission mechanism’’, of claims brought by users whose home computers had
resulting in an ‘‘inefficient underuse’’ of resources. 124 Fur- been infected with spyware, 136 the connection to the
ther, cordoning off the Internet into exclusive territories plaintiff’s real property is not evident in the electronic
will lead to a decline in innovation125 and free speech. 126 cases discussed above: where, for instance, is the proprie-
Daniel Kearney argues that the anticommons movement tary interest in real property in CompuServe? The
unrealistically sidelines the role of commerce in the pre- overburdened servers at the heart of this case were most
sent Internet, relying on a mythical conception of a likely not kept on the plaintiff’s premises. It would be
borderless Internet: ‘‘The Internet did not arrive with a difficult to argue that the use of servers at an off-site
set of pre-existing legal entitlements.’’ 127 In Kearney’s server farm would somehow affect the use and enjoy-
conception of a market-driven Internet, commercial par- ment of a separate piece of real property.
ties should be left to their own devices to come to agree- The above argument, while attractive in its sim-
ments over how best to allocate resources. 128 In this plicity, is not wholly persuasive. Nuisance should not be
sense, market forces alone will ensure that Web site rejected simply because it only applies to real property,
providers keep the Internet open to an acceptable and is therefore inapplicable to the Internet. Kam sen-
degree. 129 Additionally, other commentators argue that sibly describes this objection as a mere ‘‘formalistic
the dream of an open Internet is not realizable given obstacle’’ that should not be used to prevent nuisance
even the current level of technological methods designed from grappling with the ‘‘problems of inherently com-
to block access. 130 munal cyberspace’’. 137 The problem with casting this
Whatever the conclusion to this argument, it needs objection aside, however, is that the focus on real prop-
to be recognized that this dispute is essentially academic erty is not merely formalistic. The question that needs to
and does not adequately account for the global nature of be asked is whether nuisance can be extended to include
the Internet — the Internet has continued to grow the types of property interests at play on the Internet. It is
unabated despite the rise of electronic trespass in the on this basis that cyber-nuisance should be rejected. The
United States. And as is argued below, the cyber-nui- balancing of interests in nuisance is a direct response to
sance regime supported by members of the anticom- interactions unique to the use and enjoyment of real
mons movement is unsatisfying. Instead, the concerns of property and cannot easily extend to the operation of the
the anticommons movement can be met through a Internet in a manner that adequately protects property
robust notion of implied consent. rights.
The balancing of interests in nuisance is a recogni-
Should Electronic Trespass Be Dealt with tion that real property does not exist in isolation, but is
in Nuisance? surrounded by other parcels of real property in a
common environment:The creation of a doctrine of cyber-nuisance relies on the
flexibility of nuisance law to balance competing inter- The ambition of nuisance law has never extended to
providing every plaintiff with a serene hermitage, but hasests. 131 Steven Kam argues that trespass to chattel’s
been limited to providing restrictions on the most intoler-‘‘harm-based analysis focuses on literal damages but asks
able or obnoxious of the unpleasant consequences of livingfew questions as to the worth of the trespassory in proximity to other members of society. In this respect the
activity’’. 132Thus, using the balanced approach of nui- sanctity of any person’s proprietary interests must be
sance, the court could properly contrast the competing weighed against the competing interests put forward by
others. 138worth of the defendant’s speech in Intel with the defen-
dant’s commercial goals in eBay. 133 As such, an occupier should reasonably expect that the
The idea of using nuisance to deal with electronic effects of an action in a neighbouring property would
interferences is not a novel idea in Canada. In necessarily flow into his or her real property. Since the
Motherwell v. Motherwell, 134 the court held that a claim occupier can be expected to have the use of his or her
in nuisance was actionable for communications carried real property interfered with to a reasonable degree by a
over the telephone system. Although it was the content neighbour’s actions, the neighbour’s motives become rel-
and character of the communications that were action- evant. The electronic trespass cases discussed above do
able in Motherwell, rather than the communications not fit within the general purpose and concern of nui-
themselves, it suggests that technological communica- sance. The conception of the Internet as a common envi-
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vidual servers is at odds with the reality of an Internet server. 141 This is a curious objection, since it suggests that
made up of individual servers that can accept or reject the Internet should operate on the basis of intractable or
communications deliberately sent from other servers. forced consent where, short of removing one’s server
This is true even if, as a matter of course, individual from the network, one has to accept all incoming com-
servers accept incoming communications. The spam sent munications. Granick recognizes that system owners can
by the plaintiff in CompuServe was not the indirect legitimately take steps to prevent access, an action at
overflow of electronic signals from the defendant’s prop- odds with the concept of a public resource. The Internet
erty; it was a direct incursion onto the plaintiff’s network Granick describes resembles private property that the
in a manner more consistent with trespass than nui- public has an open invitation to use, such as commercial
sance. establishments. The Supreme Court of Canada has held
that extending an open invitation to enter to the publicCyber-nuisance is premised on the idea that some
does not give the public any general right of access. 142level of interference with other servers should be
Open access does not require the extinguishment ofallowed, regardless of whether the owner of the server
property rights.consented to the interference. What is important is the
purpose of the interference. Because the interference in Electronic trespass can operate within the frame-
Intel was worthwhile, under a cyber-nuisance regime work of an open Internet as long as Canadian courts
Hamidi would be able to trespass on Intel’s servers. follow the American jurisprudence in its treatment of
Therefore, under cyber-nuisance owners have to accept a consent. In CompuServe, for instance, the court held that
certain level of interference with their chattels, despite a the plaintiff had given its tacit consent to use its server
legitimate property interest in the functionality of because anyone could send e-mails over its network.
servers. This opens up a species of chattels to a level of This consent was removed when it requested that the
interference that would be unacceptable with other chat- defendant not send spam over its network. Similarly, in
tels with more obviously physical functions. Supporters eBay the court held that the plaintiff had given users of
of cyber-nuisance would argue that, while there is no its system a conditional access; crawling the site was
social utility in allowing parties to trespass on another’s expressly restricted by the Web site’s terms of use. By
interest in physical chattels, there are strong reasons to crawling eBay’s Web site in the face of an explicit request
allow interferences with property rights over the to cease such activity, Bidder’s Edge exceeded its consent.
Internet. However, to the extent that these concerns are Thus, an action will only lie in electronic trespass if the
valid, they can be adequately accounted through a con- plaintiff has withdrawn its consent, or the defendant has
sideration of the role consent plays in the availability of exceeded the plaintiff’s consent. 143
electronic trespass.
Consent or license is a full defence to an action in
trespass. Therefore, if courts are going to enforce actions
in trespass on the Internet, it is important to considerConsent and Electronic Trespass 
how the content of the consent or license will be deter-The abandonment of cyber-nuisance as a viable alterna-
mined. In cases where the parties have entered into ative in favour of electronic trespass does not mean the
licensing agreement, it is relatively straightforward tocommon law will inevitably be used to protect the prop-
determine what actions would exceed the scope of theerty interests of Web site owners to the ultimate detri-
license. Determining when consent has been exceededment of the Internet and society. In advocating an ‘‘open
or restricted is more difficult, but can be accomplishedInternet’’, Jennifer Granick, the executive director of the
through the recognition of implied consent and theStanford Law School Center for Internet and Society,
ability to expressly restrict consent.states:
The law should treat the Internet as open by default -- a The recognition of implied consent on the Internet
public resource rather than a gated community. This doesn’t is important because, in its absence, every electronic
mean that we can’t protect our networked computers or communication made without express consent woulddata with copyright law, passwords, firewalls or perhaps
give rise to a claim in electronic trespass. Fortunately, theeven terms-of-service agreements. But rather than asking
reality of the Internet’s technological architecture sug-whether a user obtained permission to access computers
connected to the Internet, the law should ask whether the gests that the vast majority of electronic communications
owner did anything to prevent public access. 139 over the Internet take place on the basis of implied
consent:Granick correctly highlights that impracticality of
requiring express consent for every communication (and [T]he most basic functions of the Internet — sharing
thus every use of other hardware) on the Internet. 140 It is wires and sending and receiving messages — would be
impossible without the cooperation of every single machinenot apparent, however, why this necessarily means the
connected to the global network. This cooperation, contraryInternet needs to be treated as a public resource. Adams
to judicial assumptions, requires implied consent to outsideargues that the defence of consent will not have any
use of bandwidth and processing power. 144practical effect in rationalizing the use of electronic tres-
pass because plaintiffs will simply contact potential Judicial recognition of the implied consent inherent in
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in a beneficial and reasonable manner. Thus, a user will dant’s attention. 148While the decision in CREA is rela-
not be trespassing for merely visiting a Web site — tively narrow — the defendant should have known there
opening a Web site up to the Internet implies that other would have been a terms of use provision because it had
servers will use the network’s resources. Indeed, tech- a similar document on its own Web site — it suggests
nology issues aside, it is counterintuitive to hold that an that in certain situations the scope of consent to use a
owner has not given the public an invitation to use its network’s resources can be outlined in the Web site’s
resources when the owner has taken steps to connect his terms of use. Communication of express restrictions can
or her network to the Internet. Similarly, a user would also rely on netiquette. For instance, a restriction on
not be trespassing with a robot if the user was not given consent can be communicated through commonly
any indication that his or her access was not permitted. accepted technological protections. If a user has to cir-
cumvent security protections to access a network, or ifWhile it is easy to find implied consent in basic
the robot crawls a site in violation of the terms in theelectronic communications — i.e., ‘‘visiting’’ a  Web site
Robot Exclusion Standard, it is likely that he or she has—  courts will have a more difficult time establishing the
breached the owner’s implied consent.limits of implied consent on the Internet. Given the lack
of any clear definition of the content of implied consent, By allowing the content of consent to be decided on
it is tempting to call for the adoption of legislation to a case-by-case basis, courts can develop a flexible notion
outline the type of behaviour electronic trespass is meant of implied consent informed by notions of netiquette
to catch. The benefit of legislation, in theory, is that if the and common practices, and identify situations when the
scope of consent is set by legislation, then everyone can implied consent has been restricted. This will allow elec-
govern his or her actions accordingly. However, the risk tronic trespass to be used to curtail less desirable activi-
of enacting legislation is that any list of acceptable beha- ties, and support the use of technological means to pre-
viour will quickly become outdated. There is a signifi- vent unwanted access149 without unduly limiting the
cant lag time in the creation of legislation; any statute socially useful aspects of the Internet.
designed to respond to any specific technological
problem may very well be outdated by the time it
receives royal assent. Moreover, courts have already VI. Conclusion shown themselves able to adapt to changing standards of
Internet behaviour in determining the scope of accept- ithout denying its revolutionary impact, the
able behaviour over the Internet. In 1267623 Ontario W Internet is essentially just a series of intercon-
Inc. v. Nexx Online Inc. 145 the court gave judicial nected chattels. Despite the use of monikers such as
approval of the concept of ‘‘netiquette’’ or Internet eti- ‘‘cyberplace’’, the Internet is rooted in the physical world,
quette. 146 In this case, the court held that spamming was and the transmission of electronic signals over the
a breach of netiquette for the purposes of a contractual Internet can cause actual damage off-line. Richard
term between the spammer and an ISP. Netiquette can Epstein interprets the debate over electronic trespass as
thus be used to remove the benefit of implied consent in dealing with ‘‘the hard question [of] whether technolog-
situations where, for instance, spam is sent over a com- ical changes could ever lead us to abandon the presump-
puter network, spyware is installed on a user’s personal tion that a deliberate trespass counts as a private
computer, or possibly even when a robot excessively wrong’’. 150 This paper suggests that the answer should be
crawls another server. Leaving the categories of beha- no. As a means to protect property rights in chattels,
viour open will allow courts to enforce property rights in trespass to chattels has remained relatively consistent
situations where the defendant has acted badly and thus since the Middle Ages, 151 evidence of the common law’s
deserves sanction (especially important in the absence of ability to accommodate technological change. 152 The
any harm limitation at common law in Canada). Internet is changing the manner in which people relate
The implied consent discussed above can, of course, to each other, but the common law need not be forced
be expressly restricted. However, with the exception of in radical new directions to deal with the inevitable
clearly communicated restrictions between parties such problems that arise any time two or more people
as in eBay, it is not yet clear what steps need to be taken interact. A computer network is a chattel, holding the
to effectively communicate the restriction. One possible same property rights as any other tangible object; the
way is through a Web site’s terms of use, often called mere act of connecting a computer network to another
browserwrap agreements. In CREA v. Sutton, 147 the network should not automatically open up the network
court let the plaintiff rely on its Web site’s terms of use, to unlimited interference, to the detriment of any posses-
despite the fact that it was never brought to the defen- sory interests.
Notes:
1 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, ‘‘Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An 2 Ibid.
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3 Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Cana- 28 Steve Fischer, ‘‘When Animals Attack: Spiders and Internet Tresspass’’
dian Assn. of Internet Providers, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427. (2001) 2 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. 139 at 141; this definition is paraphrased
from Danny Sullivan, ‘‘How Search Engines Work’’ (October 14, 2002)4 Jennifer A. Chandler, ‘‘Security in Cyberspace: Combatting Distributed
online: Search Engine Watch <http://searchenginewatch.com/webmas-Denial of Service Attacks’’ (2003-2004) 1 UOLTJ 231 at 260-61 and W.A.
ters/article.php/2168031>. See also ‘‘Googlebot: Google’s Web Crawler’’Adams, ‘‘There is no there there: Intel Corp. v. Hamidi and the creation of
online: Google Information for Webmasters <http://books.google.com/new common law property rights online’’ (2004) 40 Can. Bus. L.J. 87 at
webmasters/bot.html> for a description of the Internet’s most prolific101 both cite the lack of any electronic trespass cases in Canada; this
robot.author was likewise unable to find any reported cases. Indeed, the author
was not able to find any reported cases in the whole of the Common- 29 ‘‘The Web Robots FAQ’’ online: The Web Robots Page <http://
wealth. www.robotstxt.org/wc/faq.html>; this site maintains a list of known
robots as well as information on the robot.txt exclusion standard.5 Daniel Hunter, ‘‘Cyberplace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons’’ (2003) 91 Cal. L. Rev. 439 at 483. 30 Charles C. Huse, ‘‘Database Protection in Theory and Practice: Three
Recent Cases’’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 23 at 32–34.6 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, [Thrifty-Tel].
31 See, for example, Fischer, supra note 28. (‘‘Although the Internet is an7 Ibid.
incomprehensible, enormous, and chaotic collection of information, spi-8 Ibid. at 1564. ders and search engines have helped make the Internet navigable.
9 Ibid. at 1565. Without spiders and search engines, the Internet would lose much of its
value as a provider of information’’ at 180-81.)10 Ibid. at 1566.
32 A whole online business, search engine optimization (SEO), has devel-11 Ibid.
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15 Ibid. Huse, supra note 30 on the economic efficiencies of database competi-
tion.16 Task Force on Spam, ‘‘Stopping Spam: Creating a Stronger, Safer
Internet’’ (May 17, 2005) online: Industry Canada <http://e-com.ic.gc.ca/ 35 100 F. Supp.2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) [eBay]. The use of robots to collect
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36 The Robot Exclusion Standard is an unofficial and unenforced industry18 See Lily Zhang, ‘‘The CAN-SPAM Act: An Insufficient Response to the
standard developed by robot developers in the mid-1990s to protectGrowing Spam Problem’’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 301
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37 What this means in non-technical terms is that Bidder’s Edge essentiallyas a strong multi-national approach. Zhang, ibid., argues at 315 that
disguised its point of origin so eBay could not block access.trespass to chattels is not an overly effective response to spam because (1)
spammers are often located out of jurisdiction, making civil actions more 38 eBay, supra note 35 at 1069-70.
difficult to commence, and (2) the cost of bringing any litigation is
39 Ibid. at 1065-66 (‘‘eBay’s allegations of harm are based, in part, on theprohibitively expensive for individual users.
argument that BE’s activities should be thought of as equivalent to20 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) [CompuServe]. While CompuServe sending in an army of 100,000 robots a day to check the prices in awas the first spam case to involve an action in trespass to property, spam competitor’s store. This analogy, while graphic, appears inappropriate. . . .was first judicially considered in Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America [For] the analogy to be accurate, the robots would have to make up lessOnline, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1996), where the court found that than two out of every one-hundred customers in the store, the robotsthe plaintiff did not have a First Amendment right to distribute spam would not interfere with the customers’shopping experience, nor wouldover the defendant’s computer network. the robots even be seen by the customers. Under such circumstances,
21 Ibid. at 1021, paraphrasing Restatement (Second) of Torts §217(b). there is a legitimate claim that the robots would not pose any threat of
irreparable harm’’).22 Ibid.
40 Ibid. at 1070.23 Ibid. at 1022.
41 Ibid.24 Ibid.
42 Ibid. at 1071.25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. 43 Ibid. at 1063 (The figure quoted above is from the plaintiff; the defendant
claimed that its activities accounted for only 0.61% of data transferred27 Ibid. at 1023. Following CompuServe, a number of similar actions were
over the network).successfully brought in a number of different American jurisdictions; see
America Online, Inc. v. IMS et al., 24 F. Supp.2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); 44 Ibid. (The court included the following excerpt from a disposition, pre-
Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie Inc. et al., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10729 sumably from someone associated with eBay: ‘‘Q: Are you aware of any
(N.D. Cal. 1998); America Online, Inc. v. Prime Data Systems, Inc., 1998 complaints from eBay users about slowdowns that were caused by aggre-
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20226 (E.D. Va. 1998); America Online, Inc. v. LCGM, gators? A: No’’ at note 4).
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47 Maureen A. O’Rourke, ‘‘Property Rights and Competition on the 68 Ibid. at 1359. See also School of Visual Arts, et al. v. Kuprewicz et al., 771
Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy’’ (2001) 16 Berkeley Tech. N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (‘‘ In its complaint, SVA alleges that
L.J. 561 at 597. Kuprewicz caused ‘large volumes’ of unsolicited job applications and
pornographic e-mails to be sent to SVA and Pearlberg by way of SVA’s48 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. 2001) [Ticketmaster], aff’d 2001
computer system, without their consent. The complaint further allegesU.S. App. LEXIS 1454 (9th Cir. 2001); 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6483 (C.D.
that these unsolicited e-mails have ‘depleted hard disk space, drainedCal. 2003) [Ticketmaster II] (trespass to chattels claim dismissed on sum-
processing power, and adversely affected other system resources on SVA’smary judgment by defendant).
computer system’. . . . SVA maintains that Kuprewicz’s conduct is ‘particu-
49 Ticketmaster, ibid. at 7 (the plaintiff redirected all traffic from the defen- larly intrusive’ because of the substance, content and nature of the unso-
dant’s Web site to its home page; it did not appear to have taken any licited e-mails, i.e., pornographic material. However, this Court’s decision
action to stop the defendant from crawling its network). to sustain the trespass to chattels claim is not based upon the content of
the e-mails, but rather, is predicated upon plaintiffs’ allegation that its50 Ibid. at 17.
receipt of large volumes of e-mails have caused significant detrimental51 126 F. Supp.2d 238 (S.D. N.Y. 2000) [Register.com]. effects on SVA’s computer systems at 808).’’
52 A WHOIS database allows users to find the contact information, the 69 Patty M. DeGaetano, ‘‘Note: Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Private Property, Keeplocation of the name servers, and other technical information associated Out — The Unworkable Definition of Injury for a Trespass to Chattelswith a particular domain name. Claim in Cyberspace’’ (2004) 40 Cal. W.L. Rev. 355 at 382.
53 It should be noted, however, that the court did not refer to the decision 70 Steven Kam, ‘‘Cyberlaw: Intel Corp. v. Hamidi: Trespass to Chattels and ain Ticketmaster. Since the decision in Register.com cited eBay and was
Doctrine of Cyber-Nuisance’’ (2004) 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 427 at 453.only released less than four months after Ticketmaster, the court likely
did not have the benefit of the reasons in Ticketmaster during oral 71 Huse, supra note 30 at 29-30.
arguments or in writing its opinion. 72 Patricia L. Bellia, ‘‘Defending Cyberproperty’’ (2004) 79 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
54 Register.com, supra note 51 at 29-30 (the plaintiff claimed that the defen- 2164 at 2168-2169.
dant’s robot diminished the plaintiff’s network’s system resources by 73 Ibid.2.3%; at discovery, however, the plaintiff’s witness admitted that the num-
bers he used were ‘‘all rough estimates’’). 74 George H. Fibbe, ‘‘A Symposium: Lead Articles: Screen-Scraping and
Harmful Cybertrespass After Intel’’ (2004) 55 Mercer L. Rev. 1011 at55 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22520 (N.D. Cal. 2001) [Oyster Software].
1012.56 Metatags are keywords and other descriptive text in a Web page’s code
75 Ibid. at 1022.that are not displayed to users, but are meant to be read by robots and
browsers. Metatags are now largely obsolete in connection with search 76 Ibid. at 1024-25.
engine rankings.
77 384 F. Supp.2d 1219 (N.D. Ill. 2005) [Sotelo].57 Oyster Software, supra note 55 at 40. See also American Airlines, Inc. v.
78 Ibid. at 1232.Farechase, Inc. (March 8, 2003) Tarrant County, Texas No.
067-194022-02 (67th Dist. Ct.), online: Electronic Frontier Foundation 79 Ibid. at 1233.
< h t t p : / / w w w . e f f . o r g / l e g a l / c a s e s / A A _ v _ F a r e c h a s e /
80 See also Kerrins v. Intermix Media, Ltd. (January 10, 2006), CV20030310_prelim_inj.pdf>; (plaintiff airline received temporary injunc-
05-5408-RGK (SSx) (C.D. Cal. 2006) (‘‘Defendant next argues that thetion preventing defendant from crawling the plaintiff’s network for ticket
trespass to chattels claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff has notinformation on basis of trespass to chattels, among other claims, because
alleged sufficient interference with his computer. This argument lacksthe defendant’s action ‘‘results in a use and loss of [the plaintiff’s] com-
merit. Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant’s adware damages his existingputer system capacity, a loss or diminution of customer goodwill and the
software and reduced the efficiency of his computer system. Plaintiff hasopportunities for gaining and increasing customer goodwill, increased
also alleged that removal of the adware requires users to spend time andexpense, and the inability to plan for the need for increased capacity’’ at
to hire a computer specialist. These allegations are sufficient to support a2); Physicians Interactive v. Lathian Systems, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
trespass to chattels claim’’ at 2). The Defendant had previously been sued22868 (E.D. Va. 2003) (plaintiff received temporary restraining order to
by the New York Attorney general for, among other claims, trespass toprevent defendant from accessing proprietary data on server after two
chattels, ‘‘State sues major ‘spyware’ distributor’’ online: Office of Newmanual attempts and one robot-aided attempt to ‘‘hack’’ into the plain-
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer <http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/tiff’s system; harm was based on potential of unauthorized access to
2005/apr/apr28a_05.html>; the suit was settled for US$7.5 million, ‘‘Newsystem).
York Attorney General, Spyware Distributor Agree on Preliminary Settle-58 30 Cal. 4th 1342 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2003) [Intel]. ment’’ online: Government Technology <http://www.govtech.net/maga-
59 Ibid. at 1349. zine/channel_story.php/94378>. But see Directv, Inc. v. Jae Sun Chin,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15815 (W.D. Tex. 2003) [Directv] (defendant could60 Ibid. at 1352-53
not sustain a counterclaim in trespass on the allegation that on ‘‘more
To review, the undisputed evidence revealed no actual or threatened than one occasion’’, the defendant was forced to close the plaintiff’s pop-
damage to Intel’s computer hardware or software and no interference up windows; under Texas law, ‘‘[f]or liability to attach, causing actual
with its ordinary and intended operation. Intel was not dispossessed of damage to the property or depriving the owner of its use for a substantial
its computers, nor did Hamidi’s messages prevent Intel from using its period must accompany the wrongful interference’’ [emphasis in original]
computers for any measurable length of time. Intel presented no evi- at 6. The court in Sotelo distinguished the present case from Directv
dence its system was slowed or otherwise impaired by the burden of because the ‘‘plaintiff has alleged that the advertisements caused signifi-
delivering Hamidi’s electronic messages. Nor was there any evidence cantly more injury than occasional wasted time and resources, as dis-
transmission of the messages imposed any marginal cost on the opera- cussed above, and his pleading provides more specific details than the
tion of Intel’s computers. In sum, no evidence suggested that in sending scant allegations in DirectTV’’ at supra note 77 at 1232).
messages through Intel’s Internet connections and internal computer 81 See, for example, Michael R. Siebecker, ‘‘Cookies and the Common Law:system Hamidi used the system in any manner in which it was not
Are Internet Advertisers Trespassing on our Computers?’’ (2003) 76 S. Cal.intended to function, or impaired the system in any way.
L. Rev. 893 for a discussion on the applicability of electronic trespass to61 Ibid. at 1350. the unauthorized placement of cookies on personal computers.
62 Ibid. 82 See, for example, Ned Snow, ‘‘Accessing the Internet Through the
63 Ibid. at 1353. Neighbor’s Wireless Internet Connection: Physical Trespass in Virtual
Reality’’ (2006) 84 Neb. L. Rev. 1226.64 Ibid. at 1357 note 5.
83 Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder’s Edge at 19, cited in Daniel65 Ibid. at 1357.
Kearney, ‘‘NOTE: Network Effects and the Emerging Doctrine of Cyber-66 Ibid. at 1355-56. trespass’’ 23 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 313 (‘‘This brief was signed by many of
67 Ibid. at 1356 (‘‘The functional burden on Intel’s computers, or the cost in the most prominent names in the field of cyberspace law, including
time to individual recipients, of receiving Hamidi’s occasional advocacy Yochai Benkler, Dan Burk, Julie Cohen, William Fisher, Mark Lemley,
messages cannot be compared to the burdens and costs caused ISP’s and Lawrence Lessig, Maureen O’Rourke, Pamela Samuelson, and Jonathan
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84 Laura Quilter, ‘‘Cyberlaw: Regulating Conduct on the Internet: The Con- 113 Canadian Encyclopedic Digest (Ontario) vol. 32, 3d ed. (Toronto: Cars-
tinuing Expansion of Cyberspace Trespass to Chattels ’’ (2002) 17 well, 2003) ‘‘Trespass’’, §181 [emphasis added].
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 421 at 437-38. 114 (1990), 70 D.L.R. (4th) 51 (B.C.C.A.) at 131 [emphasis added], Southin
85 Hunter, supra note 5 at 486. J.A., dissenting, rev’d on other grounds [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299 [London
Drugs].86 See Eric J. Feigin, ‘‘Architecture of Consent: Internet Protocols and Their
Legal Implications’’ (2004) 56 Stan. L. Rev. 901 at 904. 115 London Drugs Ltd. V. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd., [1992] 3
S.C.R. 299 at 415 (Iacobucci J. stated that he had ‘‘some doubts as to the87 eBay, supra note 35.
correctness of the conclusions of law made by Southin J.A.’’).88 O’Rourke, supra note 47 at 589-590. 116 [1997] O.J. No. 307 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)) (QL).89 Adams, supra note 4 at 104. 117 The court awarded the plaintiff $100 in nominal damages (covering the90 Ibid. plaintiff’s claims in trespass to chattels and trespass to land). In coming to
this conclusion, the court relied, among other sources, on the quote91 Ibid. at 89.
from Halsbury used by Southin J.A. in London Drugs, supra note 114.92 Ticketmaster II, supra note 48 at 13.
118 [2000] S.J. No. 794 (Q.B.) (QL).93 Siebecker, supra note 81 at 918.
119 Ibid. at para. 25; see also James D. Hunter Enterprises Ltd. v. Hebert,94 O’Rourke, supra note 47 at 597.
(2005), 196 Man. R. (2d) 234 (Q.B.) (‘‘Although liability based on trespass
95 Although contextual factors such as necessity may be taken into account to chattels or conversion would not require proof of actual damage,
in whether the demand needs to be followed. these causes of action were not pled’’ at para. 40).
96 In the handful of cases dealing with trespass to chattels, the main sources 120 For a similar conclusion, see Adams, supra note 4 at 102.
of authority are text books as opposed to prior jurisprudence, see, for 121 See, for example, O’Rourke, supra note 47; Kam, supra note 70. Theseexample, Dass No. 47 Holdings Ltd. v. Touch Wood Inc., [1995] B.C.J.
proposals are discussed below.No. 1150 (S.C.) (QL) (‘‘In J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 4th ed.
(Toronto: Carswell, 1971) at page 50 it is stated that the action of trespass 122 David M. Fritch, ‘‘Click here for Lawsuit — Trespass to Chattels in
to goods ‘is solely concerned with protecting actual possession’ at para. Cyberspace’’ (2004) 9 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 31 at 56.
27; this is the sole authority given for the brief discussion of trespass to 123 See Feigin, supra note 86.chattels). ’’
124 Hunter, supra note 5 at 502-03 (‘‘Cyberspace was once thought to be the97 Philip H. Osborne, The Law of Torts, 2nded. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003)
modern equivalent of the Western Frontier. It was a place, albeit anat 274-275 [footnotes omitted].
abstract place, where land was free for the taking, explorers could roam,98 Daniel Hunter and Dan Burk criticize the use of trespass to land cases in and communities could form with their own rules. It was an endless
the development of electronic trespass, merging both causes of action expanse of space: open, free, replete with possibility. No longer. As with
into a single action in trespass, Hunter, supra note 5 at 487; Dan L. Burk, the Western Frontier, settlers have entered this new land, charted the
‘‘The Trouble With Trespass’’ (2000) 4 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 27. territory, fenced off their own little claims, and erected ‘No Trespassing’
signs. Cyberspace is being subdivided. Suburbs and SUVs cannot be far99 [1938] O.R. 180 (C.A.).
off’’ at 442-43 [footnotes omitted]). Burk shares this criticism, supra note100 [1954] 3 D.L.R. 775 (B.C.S.C.). 98.
101 In Lipiec v. Borsa, [1996] O.J. No. 3819, (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.) (QL), the court 125 Feigin, supra note 86 at 915.held that pointing a surveillance camera at a neighbouring property was
126 See generally Dawn C. Nunziato, ‘‘The Death of the Public Forum inactionable in nuisance and trespass. However, the harm was described
Cyberspace’’ (2005) 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1115.and the damages awarded on the basis of nuisance.
127 Kearney, supra note 83 at 345.102 Osborne, supra note 97 (‘‘The defendant’s interference with the land
must be physical. There is some unevenness in the cases as to what is 128 Ibid. at 324–327.
and what is not a physical intrusion but the requirement excludes smog,
129 Fibbe, supra note 74 (‘‘Web site owners will no more bar large numberschemical fumes, smoke, noise, odour, and probably vibrations. . . . The
of Internet users from their property than shopkeepers would ask largetort of nuisance may provide a remedy’’ at 266); see also John Fleming,
numbers of customers to leave the premises. But if a shopkeeper asks aLaw of Torts, 9th ed. (Sydney: LBC Information Services, 1998) at
patron to leave the premises, such a request should be honored’’ at464-465, cited in Lakeview Gardens Ltd. v. Regina (City) [2004] S.J. No.
1019).532 (C.A.) (QL) at para. 13.
130 Fritch, supra note 122 at 45-46; Fibbe, supra note 74.103 [1960] A.J. No. 8 (S.C.) (QL) [Phillips]. For a more thorough discussion of
this and similar American cases, see Allan D. Nielsen & Christopher B. 131 See Osborne, supra note 97 (‘‘The primary function of private nuisance
Manderville, ‘‘Seismic Access Issues’’ (2002) 40 Alta. L. Rev. 1 at 10-11. is to draw an appropriate balance between the defendant’s interest in
using land as he pleases and the plaintiff’s interest in the use and104 Nielson & Manderville, ibid. at 2.
enjoyment of land’’ at 343).105 Phillips, supra note 103 at para. 5; see also 340909 Ontario Ltd. v. Huron
Steel Products (Windsor) Ltd. (1990), 73 O.R. (2d) 641 (H.C.), aff’d (1992) 132 Kam, supra note 70 at 448.
10 O.R. (3d) 95 (C.A.) (noise and vibrations provide basis for actionable 133 Ibid. at 448–53. See also Jeremiah Kelman, ‘‘E-Nuisance: Unsolicitednuisance). Bulk E-mail at the Boundaries of Common Law Property Rights’’ (2004)
106 R. Clifton Merrell, ‘‘Trespass to Chattels in the Age of the Internet’’ 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 363 (Nuisance, ‘‘at least on a theoretical level, may be
(2002) 80 Wash. U.L.Q. 675 at 689. better equipped to address the conflicts and abuses of cyberspace gener-
ally. The framework forces a thorough analysis of policy implications of107 Ibid.
competing uses and the interests of society as a whole. The Internet and108 See Hazel Glenn Beh, ‘‘Physical Losses in Cyberspace’’ (2001) 8 Conn. electronic messaging technologies gain significant benefits from a good
Ins. L.J. 55 for a discussion of the receptivity of courts in the United degree of openness with respect to users’ ability to freely interact
States to classify intangible damage as ‘‘physical damage’’ in the interpre- without obtaining consent for each informational transaction’’ at 399).
tation of insurance contracts. 134 (1976), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 62 (Alta. S.C.A.D.) [Motherwell].109 Osborne, supra note 97 at 274. 135 Allen M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 6th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths,110 Ticketmaster, supra note 48 at 15-16. 1997) (‘‘Private nuisance may be defined as an unreasonable interference
with the use and enjoyment of land. This may come about by physical111 Richard A. Epstein, ‘‘Cybertrespass’’ (2003)  70 U. Chicago L. Rev. 73
damage to the land, interference with the exercise of an easement, profit(‘‘Firms and individuals invest substantial amounts of capital and effort
à prendre,or other similar right, or injury to the health, comfort orto create servers and Web sites that are linked to the rest of cyberspace
convenience of the occupier. In short, it is an environmental tort’’ atvia the Internet. No technical wizardry is needed to realize that the
530-531).possibilities for invasions in cyberspace parallel those in physical space’’
at 79). 136 See Osborne, supra note 97 (Motherwell is representative of the ‘‘[exten-
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to a more general and personal protection of the enjoyment of life of the by Laskin C.J.C. in his dissent in Harrison, supra note 142, cited in
permanent occupiers of homes and apartments’’ at 355. Presumably, an Adams, supra note 4 at 103. See also Fritch, supra note 122 (‘‘What this
occupier would have an actionable claim in nuisance if the spyware argument lacks, however, is the distinction of consent that typically
were so disruptive that it significantly impaired the use and enjoyment governs each of these transactions. All of these nonphysical interactions
of his or her home; there would likely be difficulties in defining the are typically governed by the doctrine of implied consent that permits
technological intrusion as continuing, rather than a single affair — i.e. even unwelcome interactions until a party is told otherwise. Violation of
the initial instillation of the spyware). this consent, even without a strictly physical intrusion, has consistently
been held as grounds for the expansion of the trespass doctrine across a137 Kam, supra note 70 at 448.
variety of mediums’’ at 50 [footnotes omitted]).138 Beth Bilson, The Canadian Law of Nuisance (Toronto: Butterworths,
144 Feigin, supra note 86 at 917-18.1991) at 32.
139 Jennifer Granick, ‘‘Open Internet, We Hardly Knew Ye’’ (September 14, 145 (Sup. Ct. J.). (1999) 45 O.R. (3d) 40.
2005) online: Wired News <http://www.wired.com/news/technology/ 146 Geist, supra note 17 at 10.0,1282,68850,00.html>.
140 See Fischer, supra note 31 at 169. 147 [2003] J.Q. no 3606 (C.S. QC) (QL) [CREA].
141 Adams, supra note 4 at 103. 148 While the case did deal with the defendant crawling the plaintiff’s site,
the claim was dealt with in contract.142 Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200 [Harrison] (mall’s open invita-
tion to the public did not mean an employee could demonstrate on 149 See Fritch, supra note 122 (‘‘Internet standards and technology havemall property once asked to leave; ‘‘Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence has already granted web site owners the type of power needed to controltraditionally recognized, as a fundamental freedom, the right of the access to their web sites. The law of trespass simply affirms and gives aindividual to the enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived legal framework to these rights’’ at 45-46 [footnotes omitted]).thereof, or any interest therein, save by due process of law’’ at 219). The
United States, by contrast, has given constitutional protection to expres- 150 Epstein, supra note 111 at 75.
sive activity on publicly used private property, Lisa Loader, ‘‘Trespass to 151 Ibid. at 76-77.Property: Shopping Centres’’ (1992) 8 J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 254.
143 See Osborne, supra note 97 at 282. The use of consent to control access 152 Epstein, Richard A. ‘‘The Roman Law of Cyberconversion’’ (2005) 2005
to private property with an open invitation to the public was advocated Mich. St. L. Rev. 103 at 119-20.
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